claude
353ab451f6
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The previous planted SYNC_API_KEY used a sk_live_-prefixed value that pattern-matches Stripe, so GitHub push protection blocked the public mirror push before any of the module's own gates ran. Swap it for a generic high-entropy value the secret-keyword detector still flags (var name is SYNC_API_KEY) without matching any specific issuer pattern. Add a "Gate 0: your hosted forge" note to M15 acknowledging that the forge's own push protection is the earliest gate; teach learners to treat it that way rather than papering over a bypass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TfzV5QvtPDz8LJS3Pu5VLT
40 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
40 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
"""Cloud-sync config for tasks-app: a realistic snapshot of what an AI hands you.
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Asked to "sync tasks to a cloud service," a model will produce something like this: it works, it
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reads naturally, it passes lint and tests... and it carries two planted flaws: a live credential
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baked straight into the source (caught by Gate 2, secret scanning) and a weak-crypto "signature"
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using MD5 (caught by Gate 3, SAST). Two different gates, two different blind spots.
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DO NOT copy these patterns. The point of this file is to be caught by a scanner, not imitated.
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The fix (read from the environment) is shown at the bottom, commented out, so you can see the
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difference once Part C of the lab is done.
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"""
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import hashlib
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# --- The problem the SECRET scanner should flag (Gate 2) ---------------------------------------
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# A hardcoded API key. Looks like a normal string literal; lint and tests will never complain.
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SYNC_API_KEY = "k7c9f2a4b8d6e1039284756abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123"
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SYNC_ENDPOINT = "https://api.example-task-cloud.com/v1/sync"
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def sync_headers() -> dict:
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return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {SYNC_API_KEY}"}
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# --- The problem the SAST scanner should flag (Gate 3) -----------------------------------------
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# AI-classic: "sign" the request body with a quick hash. MD5 is broken for anything
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# security-relevant; a textbook weak-crypto idiom. A secret scanner won't catch this (it's not a
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# secret); a SAST tool like bandit will (it's insecure code you wrote). DO NOT imitate.
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def sign_payload(body: str) -> str:
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return hashlib.md5(body.encode()).hexdigest()
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# --- The fix (Part C) --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Read the secret from the environment instead of committing it. Proper secret management (env
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# files, secret stores, per-environment config) is Module 17. This is just enough to make the
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# scanner go quiet honestly.
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#
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# import os
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# SYNC_API_KEY = os.environ["SYNC_API_KEY"] # set it outside the repo; never commit the value
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