"""Bi-directional / service functions -- profile-defined command sequences. FORScan-class functions (actuator tests, service resets, module writes) are manufacturer-specific UDS (ISO 14229) sequences, so OBDash models them as DATA in the vehicle profile (an `actions` block) rather than hardcoded logic. An Action is a small sequence the runner executes through the ELM link: optional Mode 10 diagnostic session optional Mode 27 security access (seed -> key) one+ raw command(s) (Mode 2F I/O control, Mode 31 routine, Mode 11 ECU reset, Mode 3E tester-present, ...) with response checks SAFETY: - Every action carries a `risk` (safe | caution | danger); the GUI gates caution/danger behind an explicit confirmation. - The runner sends ONLY the hex bytes defined in the profile -- nothing is synthesized. - Security-access KEY algorithms are per-vehicle secrets and are deliberately NOT bundled; only a few trivial/standard transforms are known. An action that needs an unknown algorithm is BLOCKED (fails safe) rather than guessed. """ from dataclasses import dataclass, field @dataclass class ActionStep: send: str # hex bytes to send, e.g. "1101" expect: str = "" # hex the response must contain; "" = accept UDS positive response @dataclass class Action: key: str name: str kind: str = "test" # test | actuator | reset | write risk: str = "safe" # safe | caution | danger description: str = "" warning: str = "" # shown in the confirmation for caution/danger session: str = None # Mode 10 subfunction hex (e.g. "03" extended) security: dict = None # {"level": "01", "algorithm": ""} steps: list = field(default_factory=list) # list[ActionStep] success_msg: str = "Done." # Known, NON-secret security transforms. Real per-vehicle seed->key algorithms # are proprietary and intentionally absent -- unknown algorithm => action blocked. SECURITY_ALGOS = { "xor-ff": lambda seed: bytes((b ^ 0xFF) & 0xFF for b in seed), "invert": lambda seed: bytes((~b) & 0xFF for b in seed), "add-ff": lambda seed: bytes((b + 0xFF) & 0xFF for b in seed), } def _hex(byte_list): return "".join(f"{b:02X}" for b in byte_list) def _positive(data, req_sid): """UDS positive response = request service id + 0x40 present in the data.""" return (req_sid + 0x40) in data def _is_negative(data): return 0x7F in data def validate_action(a): """Raise ValueError if an action has malformed hex / structure.""" for st in a.steps: bytes.fromhex(st.send) # raises if not valid hex if st.expect: bytes.fromhex(st.expect) if a.session is not None: bytes.fromhex(a.session) if a.security is not None and "algorithm" not in a.security: raise ValueError(f"action {a.key}: security block needs an 'algorithm'") def run_action(action, link, log=None): """Execute an Action through `link` (must expose read_raw(hex)->list[int]). Returns {"ok": bool, "message": str, "responses": [list[int], ...]}.""" def note(m): if log: log(m) def send(hexstr): return link.read_raw(hexstr) # 1. diagnostic session if action.session: d = send("10" + action.session) if not _positive(d, 0x10): return {"ok": False, "message": "could not enter diagnostic session", "responses": [d]} # 2. security access (seed -> key) if action.security: algo = action.security.get("algorithm") fn = SECURITY_ALGOS.get(algo) if fn is None: return {"ok": False, "message": f"security algorithm '{algo}' not available " "(per-vehicle secret) — action blocked for safety", "responses": []} level = action.security.get("level", "01") seed_resp = send("27" + level) if not _positive(seed_resp, 0x27): return {"ok": False, "message": "security seed request failed", "responses": [seed_resp]} i = seed_resp.index(0x67) seed = seed_resp[i + 2:] key = fn(bytes(seed)) lvl2 = f"{int(level, 16) + 1:02X}" kr = send("27" + lvl2 + _hex(key)) if not _positive(kr, 0x27): return {"ok": False, "message": "security unlock rejected", "responses": [kr]} note("security unlocked") # 3. the command steps responses = [] for st in action.steps: d = send(st.send) responses.append(d) req_sid = int(st.send[:2], 16) if st.expect: ok = bytes.fromhex(st.expect)[0] in d else: ok = _positive(d, req_sid) if not ok: reason = "ECU negative response" if _is_negative(d) else "no valid response" return {"ok": False, "message": f"{reason} to {st.send} (got {_hex(d) or 'nothing'})", "responses": responses} note(f"{st.send} -> {_hex(d)}") return {"ok": True, "message": action.success_msg, "responses": responses}