Windsurf + Aider targets, MCP server, and demo placement (#33)

Broadens both reach (more tools) and content types (an MCP server), continuing
the multi-platform story.

Windsurf + Aider:
- build-exports.mjs gains two platforms: exports/windsurf/*.md (workspace rules,
  trigger: model_decision) and exports/aider/*.md (conventions for `aider --read`).
  Now 5 platforms (ChatGPT, Gemini, Cursor, Windsurf, Aider).
- install.sh + bin/cli.mjs install both (windsurf -> .windsurf/rules, aider ->
  .aider/skills with a --read hint); generated README index is excluded from copies.
- One-line windsurf-install.sh / aider-install.sh wrappers for parity.

MCP server (new content type):
- mcp/server.mjs — zero-dependency stdio MCP server exposing list_skills,
  search_skills, get_skill. Published as a second bin (pm-claude-skills-mcp).
  Logs to stderr; reads bundled skills/ at startup. mcp/README.md documents
  client config.

Also: README hero "See it in action" demo placement (ready to swap in a GIF;
recording guide in web/docs-assets/README.md), Works-With table + exports +
install docs updated, CHANGELOG Unreleased. package.json files/bin updated.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016JWn5jRD5tcEFKrubjQ6Px

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mohitagw15856
2026-06-17 23:15:38 +01:00
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---
trigger: model_decision
description: "Write a structured incident postmortem or post-incident review. Use when asked to write a postmortem, incident report, P1/P2 review, outage report, or RCA (root cause analysis). Generates a blameless postmortem with timeline, root cause, contributing factors, impact summary, and action items."
---
# Incident Postmortem Skill
This skill produces a complete, blameless incident postmortem document following industry-standard format. Output enforces blameless framing throughout — system gaps over individual failures — and drives toward specific, closeable action items rather than vague process commitments.
## Required Inputs
Ask the user for these if not provided:
- **Incident title / ID**
- **Severity** (P1 / P2 / P3 or SEV1 / SEV2 / SEV3)
- **Date and duration** of the incident
- **What happened** (rough notes are fine — the skill will structure them)
- **Services or systems affected**
- **Customer impact** (how many users, what was degraded)
- **How it was detected**
- **How it was resolved**
- **Initial thoughts on root cause**
- **Action items already identified** (optional)
- **Responders** (who was on-call or responded — names or roles; used for the timeline, not for blame)
- **Customer or external communications sent** (optional — any status page updates, emails, or support messages with timestamps)
## Output Format
---
# Incident Postmortem: [Incident Title]
**Incident ID:** [ID]
**Severity:** [P1/P2/P3]
**Date:** [Date]
**Duration:** [Start time → Resolution time — total duration]
**Status:** [Resolved / Monitoring / Ongoing]
**Author:** [Leave blank for user to fill]
**Last updated:** [Date]
---
## Executive Summary
[35 sentences. Describe what happened, who was affected, and what was done to resolve it. Written for a non-technical stakeholder. No jargon. No blame.]
---
## Impact
| Dimension | Details |
|---|---|
| **Users affected** | [Number or percentage] |
| **Services degraded** | [List affected services] |
| **Business impact** | [Revenue, SLA breach, support tickets, etc. if known] |
| **Duration** | [Total time from first detection to full resolution] |
---
## Timeline
List events in chronological order. Each entry: `[HH:MM UTC] — [What happened. Who did what. What changed.]`
Rules for timeline entries:
- Use passive or system-focused language — avoid "X made a mistake"
- Include: first symptom, detection, escalation, hypothesis tested, fix applied, confirmation of resolution
- Note time between key events (e.g. "22 minutes between detection and escalation")
---
## Root Cause
**Primary root cause:** [One clear sentence. Technical but plain. "A misconfigured deployment config caused..."]
**Contributing factors:**
- [Factor 1 — e.g. lack of canary deployment meant change hit 100% of traffic immediately]
- [Factor 2 — e.g. alert threshold was set too high to catch the initial degradation]
- [Factor 3 — add as many as are relevant]
**Why did our existing safeguards not prevent this?**
[Honest paragraph explaining why monitoring, tests, or processes didn't catch this earlier. This is where blameless analysis matters most — focus on system gaps, not individual failures.]
---
## Detection
- **How was it first detected?** [Customer report / automated alert / internal monitoring / manual observation]
- **Time from incident start to detection:** [X minutes]
- **Should we have detected this faster?** [Yes / No — and why]
---
## Resolution
**What fixed it?** [Clear description of the actual fix — one paragraph]
**Why did this work?** [Brief technical explanation]
**Was there a temporary mitigation before full resolution?** [Yes/No — describe if yes]
---
## Action Items
| # | Action | Owner | Due Date | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | [Specific, testable action] | [Team or person] | [Date] | P1/P2/P3 |
Rules for action items:
- Each action must be specific enough to close as "done" or "not done" — no vague items like "improve monitoring"
- Distinguish between: **Prevent recurrence** (fix the root cause), **Improve detection** (catch it faster next time), **Improve response** (resolve it faster next time)
- Assign a real owner — not "team" or "TBD" if avoidable
- Flag P1 actions as items that block the incident from being marked fully closed
---
## What Went Well
[35 honest observations about the response. Include: fast collaboration, good runbooks used, effective escalation, clear communication. This section builds team confidence and reinforces good habits.]
---
## Lessons Learned
[35 key insights from this incident that are worth sharing beyond this team. Write these as transferable lessons — e.g. "Our runbook for database failover didn't account for read-replica lag. All runbooks involving database failover should be reviewed."]
---
## Communication Log
[Optional — list external communications sent: status page updates, customer emails, support responses. Include timestamps.]
---
## Quality Checks
- [ ] Timeline has no blame-focused language
- [ ] Root cause is specific (not "human error")
- [ ] Root cause answers "why did this happen?" not just "what happened?" — it names a system or process gap, not a symptom
- [ ] Contributing factors explain the systemic gaps
- [ ] Every action item has an owner and due date
- [ ] "What went well" section is genuine, not token
- [ ] No action item contains vague language like "improve monitoring", "increase resilience", or "better testing" — each must name a specific change
- [ ] Executive summary is readable by non-technical leadership
## Anti-Patterns
- [ ] Do not assign blame to individuals — postmortems must focus on system and process failures
- [ ] Do not write action items with vague language like "improve monitoring" — each must name a specific, ownable change
- [ ] Do not skip the contributing factors — root cause alone misses the systemic issues that enable incidents
- [ ] Do not omit the detection timeline — how long it took to detect matters as much as how long it took to resolve
- [ ] Do not treat the postmortem as closed until all action items have named owners and due dates
## Usage Examples
- "Write a postmortem for the [incident name] outage"
- "Help me write a P1 incident report"
- "Generate an RCA document for [service] going down on [date]"
- "Draft a blameless postmortem from these notes: [paste notes]"