docs: bring all documentation current with shipped work

A multi-agent audit of every doc against the code surfaced ~50 stale/missing
items (the roadmap/status docs and the backlog had fallen behind the code).
This catches them up:

- CLAUDE.md: phase status was ~3 phases stale ("Phase 1 is next" while Phase 1 +
  chunks of 2 & 4 shipped). Rewrote the status list; added a model-provider
  tech-stack entry; updated repo-layout (integrations objectstore/models,
  deploy backup.sh/dev compose).
- ARCHITECTURE.md: §6 privacy engine described 3 visibility levels — corrected to
  the shipped 4 (adds site_members); documented per-tree AI policy on Tree,
  LLMProvider/EmbeddingProvider split + registry, ChangeProposal origin/status/
  operations, verified-email session gate, instance-owner role, schema-drift
  guard, and the env_file config model.
- PRD.md: 4-level visibility in US-040/§5.5, instance-owner role (§5.1/§5.11),
  per-tree AI policy (§5.8), §8 sequencing annotated with shipped status, header
  date/status bumped.
- README.md: 4-level privacy; softened "Full GEDCOM 7" to the 5.5.1/7 common
  subset; noted backups + instance-owner admin; moved property/land to an
  explicit "where it's headed" (no property models exist yet).
- BACKLOG.md: flipped ~15 shipped-but-open rows to Have (ChangeProposal, provider
  abstraction, GEDCOM citation export, membership management, operator backup,
  email-verification gate, per-tree AI policy, instance owner, the whole
  visibility/public-viewing/child-resource-redaction cluster #41-#51/#46), and
  reconciled the executive summary, "current defects" list, quick wins, and
  differentiators. Left genuinely-open items (citation/source redaction, sitemap,
  per-tree noindex, scoped-token API) accurately open.
- .env.example: dropped "SMTP wired in a later phase"; documented the worker
  purge knobs, S3_PRESIGN_TTL, COOKIE_NAME; removed a stray duplicate line.
- design/: tree-visibility.md and change-proposal.md marked Shipped; corrected
  the redaction approach (reuses member schemas, not a separate PublicPersonRead)
  and the apply() rollback claim (v1 is not cross-op transactional), and marked
  rate-limiting/sitemap/noindex as deferred.

No code changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>

docs/design/tree-visibility.md

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 # Design note: tree visibility & the public viewing surface
 
-Status: **proposed** (design only — no code yet). Owner: Justin. Created 2026-06-09.
+Status: **Shipped (#41-#51)**. Owner: Justin. Created 2026-06-09.
 
-This is a privacy-critical change (it creates the first anonymous read surface in
-Provenance). Per CLAUDE.md, design before code. Implementation should land in
-small, individually-reviewable PRs, with tests on the privacy engine and the
-public read path before any anonymous endpoint is exposed.
+This is a privacy-critical change (it created the first anonymous read surface in
+Provenance). Per CLAUDE.md, it was designed before code and shipped in small,
+individually-reviewable PRs, with tests on the privacy engine and the public read
+path landing before any anonymous endpoint was exposed.
 
 ## 1. The model
 
@@ -74,13 +74,12 @@ logged-in non-member; `private` denies both.
 
 ## 4. The anonymous read path (the careful part)
 
-**Recommendation: a dedicated read-only public API namespace**, not optional-auth
-on the existing endpoints. Rationale: it is far easier to audit a small,
-purpose-built surface that *always* funnels through `person_visibility` than to
-weaken the membership checks on the authenticated endpoints and hope every branch
-is covered.
+**Shipped: a dedicated read-only public API namespace**, not optional-auth on the
+existing endpoints. Rationale: it is far easier to audit a small, purpose-built
+surface that *always* funnels through `person_visibility` than to weaken the
+membership checks on the authenticated endpoints and hope every branch is covered.
 
-- New router `app/api/v1/public.py`, mounted at `/api/v1/public`, with an
+- Router `app/api/v1/public.py`, mounted at `/api/v1/public`, with an
   **optional-auth** dependency `CurrentUserOrNone` (returns `User | None`; never
   401s). Contrast with `CurrentUser` (`deps.py:30-36`) which hard-401s.
 - Endpoints (read-only; no create/update/delete):
@@ -88,14 +87,20 @@ is covered.
     lists `site_members` when the caller is authenticated. Paginated, search via
     existing `pg_trgm`. Never lists `unlisted`/`private`.
   - `GET /public/trees/{id}` — tree metadata if `can_view_tree(user_or_none)`.
-  - `GET /public/trees/{id}/persons`, `/persons/{pid}`, `/relationships`,
-    `/events`, `/media`, … — each filtered through `person_visibility`, returning
-    redacted projections (a `PublicPersonRead` that omits PII for redacted people:
-    no exact dates, no living-person names beyond "Living", etc.).
-- **A redacted response schema**, distinct from the member `PersonRead`, so the
-  serializer physically cannot emit fields a non-member shouldn't see. Redaction
-  happens in the service, not the route.
-- **Rate limiting** on the public namespace (per-IP) to blunt scraping/enumeration.
+  - `GET /public/trees/{id}/persons`, `/persons/{pid}`, `/persons/{pid}/names`,
+    `/relationships`, `/events` — each filtered through `person_visibility`.
+    (Media is not exposed on the public surface yet — deferred.)
+- **Redaction happens in the service, before serialization** — this is the safety
+  guarantee. It did **not** ship as a separate `PublicPersonRead` schema (that
+  recommendation was not adopted): the public router **reuses the member read
+  schemas** (`PersonRead`, `RelationshipRead`, `EventRead`, `NameRead`), and only
+  the tree projection (`PublicTreeRead`) is distinct. Safety comes from
+  `public_view_service` resolving `person_visibility` and then **dropping hidden
+  rows and redacting possibly-living people** (`person_service._redact` rewrites
+  the name to "Living person", etc.) *before* a row is ever validated into a
+  schema. No route hands a raw row to the serializer.
+- **Rate limiting** on the public namespace (per-IP) is **deferred** — it is not
+  implemented in the app and may be handled at the Caddy edge if needed.
 - **Audit**: count public reads; do not log PII.
 
 ## 5. Frontend public pages
@@ -103,8 +108,12 @@ is covered.
 - New **server-rendered** routes outside the authed app shell, e.g.
   `/p/[treeId]` (tree), `/p/[treeId]/[personId]` (person), `/explore` (directory).
   Server components fetch the `/api/v1/public/*` endpoints; no login redirect.
-- `robots`: allow + sitemap for `public`; `noindex, nofollow` meta for `unlisted`
-  and `site_members`. Sitemap lists only `public` trees/persons.
+- `robots`: ships a coarse `allow: ["/", "/p/"]` rule (`frontend/app/robots.ts`)
+  that keeps the authed app out of the index. Per-tree `noindex, nofollow` meta
+  for `unlisted`/`site_members` and a `public`-only **sitemap** did **not** ship —
+  both are **deferred** follow-ups (per-tree noindex needs server rendering;
+  meanwhile `unlisted`/`site_members` trees aren't linked or listed, so they
+  aren't crawl-discoverable).
 - The directory `/explore` is anonymous for `public`; shows `site_members` trees
   only to logged-in users.
 - Reuse the tree/person view components where possible, fed by the redacted
@@ -131,7 +140,9 @@ anyone on the web. Living people stay hidden.") is worthwhile given the stakes.
   output. No raw repository reads in the public router.
 - Living-person protection holds regardless of tree visibility.
 - Unlisted relies on UUID unguessability; never expose a sequential public id.
-- `noindex` everything except `public`; sitemap is `public`-only.
+- Per-tree `noindex` (everything except `public`) and a `public`-only sitemap are
+  **deferred** (see §5); today `robots.ts` keeps the authed app out of the index
+  and `unlisted`/`site_members` trees aren't linked or listed.
 - Tests gate the merge: privacy-engine matrix + an integration test that hits the
   public endpoints anonymously and asserts no living-person PII leaks.