Add an instance owner/operator role (env-declared via OWNER_EMAIL)

Provenance had no system-level owner: ownership was only per-tree
(TreeMembership), so a self-hosted instance had no operator account and no
instance-admin surface. This adds one, declared by environment per the project's
twelve-factor rule.

- OWNER_EMAIL (comma-separated): the account(s) named here are instance owners.
  Derived at request time — no DB column, no migration, can't drift from the env,
  survives DB resets. is_instance_owner()/InstanceOwner dependency in api/deps.py.
- Ownership requires a VERIFIED email (independent of REQUIRE_EMAIL_VERIFICATION).
  Registration is open, so without this an attacker could seize the role by
  registering the owner address first; verification ties it to inbox control.
- GET /api/v1/admin/instance (owner-only): operational status — version, env,
  user/tree counts, configured AI providers. Deliberately exposes no tree data
  or PII: instance ownership is an operator role, NOT a privacy-engine bypass.
- /users/me reports is_instance_owner; frontend gains an owner-only /admin page
  and a conditional sidebar link (server-enforced, not just client-hidden).

Found-and-fixed by an adversarial security review before merge: the
verified-email land-grab (above) and a frontend null-deref where the admin page
crashed on 401/5xx instead of failing closed.

Docs: .env.example + ARCHITECTURE (notes the not-a-privacy-bypass boundary and
the verified-email requirement). Tests: owner matching, the land-grab guard,
/users/me, and owner-only /admin. Suite 96 passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-09 23:16:45 -04:00
parent 6fbad3106d
commit c5631d3eab
15 changed files with 467 additions and 5 deletions
+2 -1
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@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ Core entities and the important relationships. (Illustrative, not final DDL.)
### Tenancy & identity
- **User** — a person with login. Auth method(s) are attached but identity is internal, so one user can link multiple providers.
- **Tree** — the top-level tenant boundary for genealogical data. Owned by a User; may have additional members.
- **TreeMembership** — (User, Tree, role) where role ∈ {owner, editor, viewer}. The basis for authorization.
- **TreeMembership** — (User, Tree, role) where role ∈ {owner, editor, viewer}. The basis for authorization *within a tree*.
- **Instance owner / operator** — orthogonal to tree roles. The account(s) whose email is named in the `OWNER_EMAIL` env var **and whose email is verified** are the instance's operator(s), with access to the owner-only `/api/v1/admin` surface (operational status, instance-wide config). Derived from the env at request time — no DB column, no migration, can't drift, survives DB resets. The verified-email requirement is deliberate: registration is open, so without it whoever registers the owner address first would seize the role — verification ties ownership to proven control of the inbox. Crucially this is **not** a privacy bypass: an instance owner gets operational/config rights, **not** read access to other users' private trees or living-person PII — those still resolve only through the privacy engine. (`is_instance_owner` in `api/deps.py`.)
### Genealogical core
- **Person** — belongs to a Tree. Has many **Name** records (with parts: given, surname, prefix/suffix, and a type such as birth/married/alias) to support variants and changes over time. Carries living/deceased status.