Provenance had no system-level owner: ownership was only per-tree
(TreeMembership), so a self-hosted instance had no operator account and no
instance-admin surface. This adds one, declared by environment per the project's
twelve-factor rule.
- OWNER_EMAIL (comma-separated): the account(s) named here are instance owners.
Derived at request time — no DB column, no migration, can't drift from the env,
survives DB resets. is_instance_owner()/InstanceOwner dependency in api/deps.py.
- Ownership requires a VERIFIED email (independent of REQUIRE_EMAIL_VERIFICATION).
Registration is open, so without this an attacker could seize the role by
registering the owner address first; verification ties it to inbox control.
- GET /api/v1/admin/instance (owner-only): operational status — version, env,
user/tree counts, configured AI providers. Deliberately exposes no tree data
or PII: instance ownership is an operator role, NOT a privacy-engine bypass.
- /users/me reports is_instance_owner; frontend gains an owner-only /admin page
and a conditional sidebar link (server-enforced, not just client-hidden).
Found-and-fixed by an adversarial security review before merge: the
verified-email land-grab (above) and a frontend null-deref where the admin page
crashed on 401/5xx instead of failing closed.
Docs: .env.example + ARCHITECTURE (notes the not-a-privacy-bypass boundary and
the verified-email requirement). Tests: owner matching, the land-grab guard,
/users/me, and owner-only /admin. Suite 96 passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
New account_service + endpoints under /users/me:
- GET /me/export — zip of every owned tree (account.json + media blobs).
- POST /me/import — restore a backup into NEW trees (ids remapped, media
re-uploaded); non-destructive, never touches existing data.
- DELETE /me — soft-delete the user, their owned trees, and revoke sessions;
guarded by retyping the account email.
Settings page wires all three (export download, restore upload, delete with
typed-email confirmation). No migration — uses existing tables + soft-delete.
52 backend tests pass (export→restore round-trip + delete guards); frontend builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Names (the genealogy standard: maiden name primary, married/alias as typed
alternates):
- Name model already supported multiple typed names; expose full CRUD —
NameCreate/Read/Update schemas, name_service (one-primary invariant,
promote-on-delete), nested /persons/{id}/names routes.
- Person page gains a Names card: add/edit/delete + "make primary", with a
curated name_type dropdown (birth/maiden, married, alias, nickname, …).
Self-person ("who am I"):
- users.self_person_id FK (use_alter for the users<->persons<->trees cycle)
+ migration; PATCH /users/me/self-person; "This is me" / "This is you"
on the person page. Soft-deleting the linked person clears it.
Deletion integrity (fixes the broken tree view):
- delete_person now soft-deletes the relationships touching the person, so no
dangling edges remain; family-chart also filters links to missing people.
- Optional cascade=true recursively deletes descendants (GEDCOM cleanup);
the person page asks "only this person" vs "with all descendants".
- DELETE returns {deleted: n}.
Family view surfaces "Not connected to anyone" so dangling people aren't lost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pluggable AuthProvider interface with a local (email+password) implementation, and a Mailer interface (ConsoleMailer for dev, SMTPMailer for operators). The auth service owns registration, login, opaque session issuance, email verification, and password reset (which revokes prior sessions). Endpoints under /api/v1/auth; sessions are returned as a Bearer token and set as an HttpOnly cookie.
Replaces the temporary X-User-Id shim: get_current_user now resolves a real session (Bearer or cookie). The open user-bootstrap endpoint is gone (registration replaces it). App logging is configured so the ConsoleMailer's verification/reset links are visible to self-hosters. Verified end-to-end on the deploy target, including the email-verification flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
Wires the data model through repository -> service -> API/v1. The privacy engine (app/services/privacy.py) is the single enforcement point: every read resolves visibility there (tree role, tree visibility, per-person override; living-person redaction is a marked Phase 2 TODO). All writes record an attributable AuditEntry.
Endpoints: POST /users (open dev bootstrap until auth), GET /users/me, POST/GET /trees, GET /trees/{id}, and POST/GET /trees/{id}/persons. Authn is a temporary X-User-Id header shim; authz is membership-based (owner/editor/viewer). Domain errors map to 401/403/404/409. Verified on the deploy target: private tree -> 403 for non-members, missing actor -> 401, audit log populated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
justin