Two tables (sessions, user_tokens) + migration; only token *hashes* are stored, so a DB leak yields no usable credential. Argon2id password hashing and token primitives in app/core/security. Config and .env.example gain session/cookie/token TTLs, app base URL, and SMTP settings (twelve-factor). Migration verified reversible (drops the token_purpose enum) and matches the models.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
Wires the data model through repository -> service -> API/v1. The privacy engine (app/services/privacy.py) is the single enforcement point: every read resolves visibility there (tree role, tree visibility, per-person override; living-person redaction is a marked Phase 2 TODO). All writes record an attributable AuditEntry.
Endpoints: POST /users (open dev bootstrap until auth), GET /users/me, POST/GET /trees, GET /trees/{id}, and POST/GET /trees/{id}/persons. Authn is a temporary X-User-Id header shim; authz is membership-based (owner/editor/viewer). Domain errors map to 401/403/404/409. Verified on the deploy target: private tree -> 403 for non-members, missing actor -> 401, audit log populated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
Phase 0 foundation. uv-managed FastAPI app (package=false, runs from source via uv run). Layered seams in place: app/api for routers, app/core for config (pydantic-settings, fully env-driven) and the async SQLAlchemy engine; service/repository/domain layers land with the data model.
Exposes /health (liveness) and /health/ready (Postgres reachability via SELECT 1, 503 on failure) so the deploy wiring is verifiable before any data model exists. Includes a liveness test and the resolved uv.lock. Ignore pytest/ruff/mypy caches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
justin