Files
provenance/backend/tests
justin 9820a77d25 Visibility phase 3: redaction-safe public read API + leak test
Adds the anonymous read surface (/api/v1/public) — the privacy-critical core.

- CurrentUserOrNone dependency: optional auth that never 401s (anonymous OK).
- public_view_service: every projection passes through privacy.person_visibility.
  persons redacted (living → "Living person", hidden dropped); relationships
  only when both endpoints non-hidden; events only for FULL-visibility persons
  (partnership events only when both partners full); names only for FULL
  persons. Not-viewable trees raise 404 (not 403) so the surface can't probe
  for private trees. Media deferred (higher-sensitivity; own pass later).
- public router: read-only directory + tree + persons/relationships/events +
  person detail/names/events. Directory lists `public` to all and adds
  `site_members` for authenticated callers; never lists unlisted/private.
- PublicTreeRead omits owner_id.

Tests (ran locally — CI does not run pytest): an anonymous end-to-end leak test
asserting a living person's real name, alias, and birth year appear in NO public
response while the deceased person's data does; plus private=404, unlisted
viewable-by-link-but-unlisted, site_members requires login, and directory
visibility. Full suite: 70 passed. Regenerated openapi.json + TS client.

Note: the AUTHED list endpoints still leak per-person for non-members
(pre-existing) — fixed next, separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
2026-06-09 09:17:41 -04:00
..