Documentation: install/upgrade/uninstall guides + recipes incl. Zerto

Adds a docs/ folder under the repo root with full operator documentation
aimed at sysadmins (not webhook developers). The Zerto pre/post script
recipe is the canonical "why does this exist" walkthrough; the GitHub
HMAC, AD password reset, and UI-on-desktop recipes round out common
patterns.

Pages:
- README.md (index)
- concepts.md (5-minute "what is a webhook" explainer)
- installation.md (interactive + silent install)
- upgrading.md (single-click upgrade flow + edge cases)
- uninstalling.md (clean removal + wiping ProgramData)
- runas-modes.md (Service / InteractiveUser / SpecificUser decision flow)
- service-account-and-ad.md (gMSA setup, delegated rights)
- network-and-security.md (bind addresses, allowlists, HTTPS, secret storage)
- troubleshooting.md (symptom -> first check, common errors)
- recipes/zerto-pre-post-scripts.md (canonical use case)
- recipes/github-style-hmac.md (GitHub / Stripe-shaped webhooks)
- recipes/ad-password-reset.md (gMSA-backed self-service reset)
- recipes/ui-on-desktop.md (InteractiveUser pattern)

Top-level README.md restructured to point at docs/ as the source of
truth, dropping the duplicated installation snippets.

Installer ships docs/ alongside the binaries so they're available
offline at C:\Program Files\WebhookServer\docs\. GUI Help menu gains
a "Documentation" item that opens the docs site in a browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-08 10:34:47 -04:00
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# Recipe: AD password reset endpoint
A self-service password reset URL your help-desk tool can hit. Single endpoint, gMSA-backed, audited.
## Architecture
- The webhook host is domain-joined
- The service runs as a gMSA with **Reset Password** + **Write pwdLastSet** delegated on the OUs containing target users
- The endpoint is HMAC-signed, IP-allowlisted to the help-desk app's server
- Every reset is logged in the daily log file with caller IP, target user, runId, and result
## Prerequisites
- gMSA created and installed on the host. See [Service account & Active Directory](../service-account-and-ad.md).
- Service installed with `-ServiceAccount 'CONTOSO\svc-webhookserver$'`
- Delegate the right permissions on the OU(s):
```powershell
$ou = "OU=Standard Users,DC=contoso,DC=local"
dsacls $ou /I:S /G "CONTOSO\svc-webhookserver$:CA;Reset Password;user"
dsacls $ou /I:S /G "CONTOSO\svc-webhookserver$:WP;pwdLastSet;user"
```
## The script
`C:\Scripts\ad-password-reset.ps1`:
```powershell
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$body = $input | ConvertFrom-Json
if (-not $body.samAccountName) { throw 'samAccountName is required' }
if (-not $body.newPassword) { throw 'newPassword is required' }
if (-not $body.requestedBy) { throw 'requestedBy is required (audit field)' }
# Refuse to touch privileged groups
$user = Get-ADUser -Identity $body.samAccountName -Properties MemberOf
$denyGroups = @('Domain Admins','Enterprise Admins','Schema Admins')
foreach ($g in $user.MemberOf) {
$name = ($g -split ',')[0] -replace '^CN='
if ($denyGroups -contains $name) {
throw "refusing to reset password for member of $name"
}
}
$secure = ConvertTo-SecureString $body.newPassword -AsPlainText -Force
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity $user -NewPassword $secure -Reset
Set-ADUser -Identity $user -ChangePasswordAtLogon $true
# Audit line goes to the webhook log automatically (return value becomes stdout).
"reset $($user.SamAccountName) requested by $($body.requestedBy)"
```
## Endpoint configuration
| Section | Setting | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | Slug | `ad-reset` |
| Auth | Mode | **HMAC** with a strong secret shared with the help-desk app |
| Auth | HMAC header | `X-Signature-256` |
| Auth | HMAC prefix | `sha256=` |
| Auth | HMAC encoding | hex |
| Allowed clients | | `10.50.10.20` *(the help-desk app's IP only)* |
| Executor | Type | Windows PowerShell |
| Executor | Script path | `C:\Scripts\ad-password-reset.ps1` |
| Data passing | JSON body to stdin | ✓ |
| Data passing | Headers/query as env vars | ✗ |
| Run as | Identity | **Service** *(uses the gMSA)* |
| Response | Mode | Sync |
| Response | Timeout (sec) | 30 |
| Response | Fail on non-zero exit | ✓ |
## Calling it
```powershell
$body = @{
samAccountName = 'jdoe'
newPassword = 'TempP@ssw0rd!2026'
requestedBy = 'helpdesk_user@contoso.local'
} | ConvertTo-Json
$bytes = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($body)
$hmac = [Security.Cryptography.HMACSHA256]::new(
[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes('your-shared-secret'))
$sig = ([BitConverter]::ToString($hmac.ComputeHash($bytes)) -replace '-','').ToLower()
Invoke-RestMethod -Method POST `
-Uri 'http://webhooks.contoso.local:8080/hook/ad-reset' `
-Headers @{ 'X-Signature-256' = "sha256=$sig" } `
-ContentType 'application/json' -Body $body
```
## Operational notes
**Audit log**: every call lands in `C:\ProgramData\WebhookServer\logs\webhook-YYYYMMDD.log` with one line per run including the runId, slug, caller IP, exit code, and the script's stdout (the `"reset jdoe requested by helpdesk_user"` line). Ship those logs to your SIEM via the usual file-collector flow.
**Rotating the HMAC secret**: edit the endpoint in the GUI, replace the secret, save. The help-desk app needs the new secret too — coordinate the cutover. There's no overlap window built in; if you need a soft rollover, create a second endpoint with the new secret and switch caller traffic over.
**Privileged-group guard**: the script's `denyGroups` check is a basic guard. If a more sophisticated guard is needed (target user attribute, OU-based logic), add it in the script — that's the right place, not the webhook server.
**Self-service from the user side**: don't expose this endpoint to end users directly. Front it with a help-desk app that authenticates the user (preferably with MFA), then makes the call to the webhook with its bearer/HMAC credentials. The webhook server is the *plumbing*; not the *front door*.
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# Recipe: GitHub-style HMAC-signed webhook
GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Shopify, and most SaaS providers sign their outbound webhooks with HMAC. The receiver computes the same HMAC over the request body using a shared secret and rejects the request if the signatures don't match. Webhook Server has this built in — you just point a real GitHub webhook at your endpoint.
## What we're building
A webhook URL that GitHub calls on every push to a repo. The server runs a PowerShell script that pulls the latest commit and triggers a deployment. Authentication is HMAC-SHA256 over the request body, using the secret you configured in GitHub's webhook settings.
## On the GitHub side
In your repo: **Settings → Webhooks → Add webhook**.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Payload URL | `https://hooks.contoso.com/hook/gh-deploy` (yes, HTTPS — GitHub enforces it for public hosts) |
| Content type | `application/json` |
| Secret | Generate a long random string. Copy it for the next step. |
| SSL verification | Enable |
| Events | Just `push` |
Save. GitHub immediately delivers a `ping` event for testing. You'll see it in **Recent Deliveries** with whatever response code your server returns.
## The PowerShell deployment script
`C:\Scripts\gh-deploy.ps1`:
```powershell
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$payload = $input | ConvertFrom-Json
# Verify the event type via the X-GitHub-Event header passed as an env var
$event = $env:WEBHOOK_HEADER_X_GITHUB_EVENT
if ($event -eq 'ping') {
"got ping from $($payload.repository.full_name)"
return
}
if ($event -ne 'push') {
Write-Error "ignoring $event event"
}
$repo = $payload.repository.full_name
$branch = $payload.ref -replace '^refs/heads/', ''
$sha = $payload.after
if ($branch -ne 'main') {
"ignoring push to $branch"
return
}
$repoDir = "C:\Deploys\$($payload.repository.name)"
if (-not (Test-Path $repoDir)) {
git clone "https://github.com/$repo.git" $repoDir
}
Push-Location $repoDir
try {
git fetch --all
git reset --hard $sha
# ...your build/deploy steps here...
& npm ci
& npm run build
Restart-Service MyAppService
}
finally {
Pop-Location
}
"deployed $repo @ $sha"
```
## Configure the endpoint
**File → New endpoint**:
| Section | Setting | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | Slug | `gh-deploy` |
| Auth | Mode | **HMAC** |
| Auth | HMAC secret | paste the GitHub-side secret |
| Auth | HMAC header | `X-Hub-Signature-256` *(GitHub's default)* |
| Allowed clients | | `140.82.112.0/20`, `192.30.252.0/22` *(GitHub's webhook IP ranges; check [docs.github.com](https://api.github.com/meta) for the live list)* |
| Executor | Type | **Windows PowerShell** |
| Executor | Script path | `C:\Scripts\gh-deploy.ps1` |
| Data passing | JSON body to stdin | ✓ |
| Data passing | Headers/query as env vars | ✓ *(needed so `WEBHOOK_HEADER_X_GITHUB_EVENT` is set)* |
| Run as | Identity | **Service** (default) — assumes the deployment is local |
| Response | Mode | **Async** *(GitHub times out fast; don't make it wait for the build)* |
| Response | Timeout (sec) | `600` |
Save.
## What HMAC does for you here
GitHub computes `sha256(body, secret)` and sends it as `sha256=<hex>` in `X-Hub-Signature-256`. Webhook Server computes the same hash, verifies in fixed time, and rejects (401) on mismatch.
This means:
- A request with a tampered body fails the check
- A captured request can be **replayed verbatim** (the signature is valid for that body) — if that matters, GitHub also includes a `X-GitHub-Delivery` ID and timestamp you can deduplicate against
- The secret never travels over the network — only the digest does, so HTTPS is for confidentiality of the body, not the secret
## Adapting for Stripe, Slack, etc.
Same pattern, different headers and signing details. The four HMAC fields in the editor cover all common variants:
| Provider | Header | Prefix | Encoding | Algorithm |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GitHub | `X-Hub-Signature-256` | `sha256=` | hex | SHA-256 |
| Stripe | `Stripe-Signature` | (none — but Stripe's format is multipart, see below) | hex | SHA-256 |
| Slack | `X-Slack-Signature` | `v0=` | hex | SHA-256 |
| Generic / custom | configurable | configurable | configurable | SHA-1 / SHA-256 / SHA-512 |
**Stripe** is special: their `Stripe-Signature` header has the format `t=<timestamp>,v1=<sig>,v0=<sig>`, where `v1` is HMAC-SHA256 of `<timestamp>.<body>`. Webhook Server's straight HMAC check doesn't match Stripe's signed-with-timestamp scheme. Workarounds:
- Use **Bearer auth** on Stripe webhooks instead, since you already control the secret
- Or do unauthenticated + IP allowlist + a script-side signature check using their official validation library
For everything that's "GitHub-shaped" (signed body, raw HMAC), the built-in HMAC mode is the right pick.
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# Recipe: Pop UI on the user's desktop
The classic "fire a hook from your phone, see a calculator window appear on your PC." Useful for:
- Triggering interactive installers / wizards
- Opening browser tabs to specific dashboards on demand
- Playing a sound / showing a toast notification
- Demos and party tricks
## Why this is non-trivial on Windows
The Webhook Server service runs as `LocalSystem` in **session 0**. Anything launched normally from a Service-mode endpoint also lands in session 0, which has no visible desktop — UI runs but nobody sees it. To put a window on the desktop of whoever is logged in at the keyboard, the service has to:
1. Find the active console session ID (`WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId`)
2. Get a primary token for the user in that session (`WTSQueryUserToken`)
3. Spawn the new process with `CreateProcessAsUser` against that token, targeting `winsta0\default`
Webhook Server does all of this for you when the endpoint's **Run as** is set to **InteractiveUser**.
## Configure the endpoint
| Section | Setting | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | Slug | `calc` |
| Identity | Description | "Pop calculator on the logged-in user's desktop" |
| Auth | Mode | None / Bearer — your call |
| Allowed clients | | restrict; this is interactive UI |
| Executor | Type | **Executable** |
| Executor | Executable path | `C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe` |
| Run as | Identity | **InteractiveUser** |
| Response | Mode | **Async** *(calc never exits on its own; sync would 30-second-timeout-kill it every time)* |
| Response | Fail on non-zero exit | unticked |
Save. Hit `http://localhost:8080/hook/calc` from anywhere — calc.exe pops up on your desktop.
## Limits
- **Service must run as LocalSystem.** Only SYSTEM has the `SeTcbPrivilege` required for `WTSQueryUserToken`. If you switched the service to a gMSA (e.g. for AD-write hooks), this mode stops working. Run two instances of Webhook Server on different ports if you need both.
- **Someone must be logged in** at the console. If the desktop is at the lock screen with no user signed in, the hook fails with `No active console session - is anyone logged in at the keyboard?`.
- **RDP sessions complicate things.** `WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId` always returns the *console* session, not RDP sessions. If only RDP users are connected and no one is at the physical keyboard, this mode fails. (A separate API, `WTSQueryUserToken` against an enumerated session ID, can target RDP — that'd be a v0.x feature request.)
- **Multiple users logged in via fast-user-switching** — the hook lands in whichever session is currently active (the foreground desktop), not all of them.
## Variations
### Notification toast instead of a window
Use a PowerShell script that emits a Windows 10/11 toast via `BurntToast` (third-party module) or the built-in WinRT API:
```powershell
# requires: Install-Module BurntToast
New-BurntToastNotification -Text 'Webhook fired',$($input | Out-String)
```
Configure the endpoint as InteractiveUser + WindowsPowerShell + inline command. The toast appears as the logged-in user — same as if they fired it themselves.
### Open a URL in the user's default browser
```powershell
Start-Process ($input | ConvertFrom-Json).url
```
Body: `{ "url": "https://contoso.servicenow.com/incident/123" }`
This opens the URL in whatever the user has set as default. Handy for "page on-call → they reply on their phone with a link → URL opens on their workstation when they sit down."
### Run a setup wizard / installer that needs UI
Some installers refuse to run silently or have steps that require human input. Wrap them as InteractiveUser hooks so the operator can trigger them from a help-desk console without having to RDP in.
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# Recipe: Zerto pre/post scripts → AD / DNS update
This is the canonical reason Webhook Server exists. Zerto's failover, move, and clone operations support pre- and post-scripts — but those scripts run on the Zerto Virtual Manager (ZVM), not on the destination domain controller or DNS server. To touch AD or DNS during a failover you need either:
- A bastion / utility host with the right modules and credentials installed (and you accept the maintenance burden of keeping its scripts in sync)
- **A webhook on a Windows host** — Zerto's pre/post calls a single URL, and the webhook server runs the right PowerShell on the right machine with the right identity. This page is about that.
## What we're building
A Zerto pre/post script POSTs to `http://webhooks.contoso.local:8080/hook/dr-failover-prep` with a JSON body identifying the VPG and target VMs. The webhook server, running on a domain-joined utility host as a gMSA with delegated AD rights, runs PowerShell that:
1. Updates AD computer object descriptions to indicate they're now at the DR site
2. Updates DNS A records to point `app01.contoso.local` and friends at the new (DR) IPs
3. Posts a result line to a Teams channel
4. Returns 200 with the summary so it shows up in Zerto's pre/post script log
It's about ~30 lines of PowerShell on the server side and 3 lines of script in Zerto.
## Prerequisites
On the webhook host:
- Webhook Server installed (see [Installation](../installation.md))
- The host is domain-joined
- The service account has the **AD permissions** it needs. We'll configure this two ways below — the simple way (LocalSystem + delegated rights to the machine account) and the production way (gMSA).
- DNS PowerShell module installed if you'll modify DNS: `Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-DNS-Server` (Server) or RSAT installed (Win 10/11).
- AD PowerShell module: `Install-WindowsFeature RSAT-AD-PowerShell` (Server).
On the Zerto side:
- ZVM 8.x or 9.x (this works with both)
- A Virtual Protection Group (VPG) you want to wire up
## 1. Plan the script and the inputs
What does the script need to know? At minimum:
- **VPG name** — Zerto exposes this as a parameter to the pre/post script
- **VM names** — likewise
- **Target IPs** — depending on your failover topology, these may be static (DR network has known IPs) or known after Zerto reconfigures the IP
Decide what travels in the request body and what's hardcoded. A pragmatic split:
- Hardcoded (in the PowerShell script on the webhook host): zone name, AD OU, Teams webhook URL, mapping table from VM hostname → target IP
- Sent in the body: VPG name, list of VM names, an "operation" field (`failover`, `move`, `failback`, etc.)
Example body the Zerto script will send:
```json
{
"operation": "failover",
"vpg": "App-Production",
"vms": ["app01", "app02", "db01"]
}
```
## 2. Write the PowerShell script on the webhook host
Save this as `C:\Scripts\dr-failover-prep.ps1` on the webhook host:
```powershell
[CmdletBinding()]
param()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# Read the body from stdin (the webhook server pipes the JSON in for us when
# StdinJson is enabled).
$body = $input | ConvertFrom-Json
# Hardcoded site config - edit for your environment.
$dnsServer = 'dc01.contoso.local'
$forwardZone = 'contoso.local'
$adOu = 'OU=Servers,DC=contoso,DC=local'
$teamsWebhook = 'https://contoso.webhook.office.com/...' # one-way, no secret to leak
$drIpMap = @{
'app01' = '10.42.10.11'
'app02' = '10.42.10.12'
'db01' = '10.42.10.21'
}
$summary = @()
foreach ($vm in $body.vms) {
if (-not $drIpMap.ContainsKey($vm)) {
$summary += "skip $vm - no DR IP mapping"
continue
}
$newIp = $drIpMap[$vm]
# 1. Update DNS A record (delete + recreate is the simplest reliable path)
$existing = Get-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName $forwardZone -Name $vm `
-RRType A -ComputerName $dnsServer -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($existing) {
Remove-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName $forwardZone -Name $vm `
-RRType A -RecordData $existing.RecordData.IPv4Address `
-ComputerName $dnsServer -Force
}
Add-DnsServerResourceRecordA -ZoneName $forwardZone -Name $vm `
-IPv4Address $newIp -ComputerName $dnsServer -TimeToLive 00:05:00
# 2. Update AD computer description so on-call can see at a glance
Set-ADComputer -Identity $vm -Description "[DR-$($body.operation)] $(Get-Date -Format s)"
$summary += "ok $vm -> $newIp"
}
# 3. Notify Teams
$msg = @{
text = "Webhook DR prep for VPG **$($body.vpg)** ($($body.operation)):`n" +
($summary -join "`n")
} | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $teamsWebhook -Method POST -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $msg | Out-Null
# 4. Print the summary so Zerto's pre/post script log captures it
$summary -join "`n"
```
A few choices worth calling out:
- **`$input | ConvertFrom-Json`** — Webhook Server pipes the request body into the script via stdin when "JSON body to stdin" is ticked. `$input` is PowerShell's automatic variable for pipeline input.
- **`$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'`** — turn cmdlet warnings into terminating errors so the script exits non-zero on real problems. Webhook Server then returns 502 (configurable via "Fail on non-zero exit") and Zerto sees the failure.
- **Two-way Teams notification but one-way return** — the script's stdout becomes the HTTP response. Zerto logs it. The Teams notification is a separate Invoke-RestMethod.
## 3. Configure the endpoint in the GUI
In Webhook Server's GUI, **File → New endpoint**:
| Section | Setting | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | Slug | `dr-failover-prep` |
| Identity | Description | "Zerto pre-script: update AD/DNS during failover" |
| Auth | Mode | **Bearer** |
| Auth | Bearer secret | generate a 32-byte random string; copy it for the Zerto script |
| Allowed clients | (one per line) | `10.0.0.0/8` (your ZVM's network) |
| Executor | Type | **Windows PowerShell** |
| Executor | Script path | `C:\Scripts\dr-failover-prep.ps1` |
| Data passing | JSON body to stdin | ✓ |
| Data passing | Headers/query as env vars | ✗ |
| Run as | Identity | **Service** if the service is running as a gMSA with AD rights, otherwise **SpecificUser** with a delegated account |
| Response | Mode | **Sync** |
| Response | Timeout (sec) | `60` |
| Response | Fail on non-zero exit | ✓ |
Save. Right-click the row → **Copy URL** to grab the full URL, e.g. `http://webhooks.contoso.local:8080/hook/dr-failover-prep`.
> **Why Bearer auth and not None?** Even though the IP allowlist limits who can reach this endpoint, the Bearer token is a defense-in-depth layer. If someone managed to spoof or get on the trusted network, they still need the token. Generate it once, store it in a secrets manager (or in Zerto's encrypted script parameters), and never email it.
## 4. The Zerto pre/post script
Zerto pre/post scripts are PowerShell files placed on the ZVM. The path varies by Zerto version; in 9.x it's typically `C:\Program Files\Zerto\Zerto Virtual Replication\Scripts\`.
Create `dr-failover-prep.ps1` on the ZVM:
```powershell
# Zerto passes context as parameters/environment - exact names vary by version.
# Document yours; this is illustrative.
param(
[string]$VpgName = $env:ZertoVPGName
)
$webhookUrl = 'http://webhooks.contoso.local:8080/hook/dr-failover-prep'
$bearer = 'paste-the-bearer-secret-here' # store via Zerto secret param if available
# Build the body. In a real script, list the VMs by querying Zerto's API or by
# convention from the VPG name.
$body = @{
operation = 'failover'
vpg = $VpgName
vms = @('app01','app02','db01')
} | ConvertTo-Json
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Method POST -Uri $webhookUrl -Body $body `
-ContentType 'application/json' -TimeoutSec 90 `
-Headers @{ Authorization = "Bearer $bearer" }
# Print whatever the webhook returned to Zerto's log.
$response.stdout
```
Wire this script into your VPG's **Pre-Recovery** or **Post-Recovery** hook in the Zerto UI.
## 5. Test before going live
In a maintenance window, hit the endpoint manually with a fake VPG name to confirm the wiring works:
```powershell
$body = @{ operation='test'; vpg='SmokeTest'; vms=@('app01') } | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Method POST `
-Uri http://webhooks.contoso.local:8080/hook/dr-failover-prep `
-Headers @{ Authorization = "Bearer paste-the-secret" } `
-ContentType application/json -Body $body
```
You should see the summary line(s) come back, AD descriptions update, DNS A records update, and a Teams notification. If anything's off:
- **No response, hang** → check the GUI's log panel. The auto-poll updates every 3 seconds. Look for the run line with the slug + exit code.
- **401 Unauthorized** → bearer mismatch
- **403 Forbidden** → IP allowlist blocking you
- **502 Bad Gateway** → script ran but exited non-zero. The response body has stderr.
After a real failover triggers it, audit by checking the daily log file at `C:\ProgramData\WebhookServer\logs\webhook-YYYYMMDD.log` for the `Run <id> dr-failover-prep ok exit=0` line.
## Variations
### Different actions for failover vs. failback
Pass an `operation` field in the body and branch on it in the PowerShell. The script above already does this — extend the `switch` to handle `failback` (revert DNS to production IPs, clear DR description, etc.).
### Per-VPG endpoints
If you want fine-grained access control per VPG, create one endpoint per VPG and give each its own bearer secret. The GUI's grid handles dozens of endpoints fine.
### Async + callback for long-running work
If your AD/DNS update genuinely takes minutes (e.g., updating thousands of records in a large environment), set the endpoint to **Async** mode. Zerto's pre-script gets `202 Accepted` immediately and continues. Configure the endpoint's **Callback** with a URL that records the result (e.g., another endpoint that logs to a file, or your monitoring system's API).
### Audit trail to a SIEM
Configure each endpoint's **Callback** with your SIEM's HTTP collector URL + an HMAC secret. Every run produces a JSON record with runId, exit code, duration, stdout, and stderr — perfect for compliance audit logs.