The catalog is opt-in: an unlisted tool passes through unguarded. The
shipped starter list was ssh/exec and ansible/run_playbook, both Linux
shaped, so an agent changing a protected Windows guest over WinRM or
PowerShell was never guarded at all. That does not fail loudly, it
simply never inserts a checkpoint.
Adds winrm/run_command, winrm/run_ps, powershell/invoke_command and
smb/write_file. The smb entry is there because a file written into a
share changes the guest without any shell being involved.
Test asserts the example config covers both platforms and that every
entry names a vm_arg, since without one the guard cannot resolve a VM.
Still illustrative, not exhaustive: tool names vary per MCP server, so
users add their own with zerto_add_mutating_tool. That reactive model is
the real weakness here and is worth revisiting separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016yVfC5nvZowoLFnEGWhLGn
justinandClaude Opus 5
e5f05eff6c