claude
389ac2e460
Apply the no-ai-slop standard (now binding in AGENTS.md): the em-dash character is banned outright (restructured, not blind-replaced), plus the banned word/phrase list (delve, leverage, robust, seamless, truly, unlock, etc.). 0 em-dashes remain in modules + capstone; the only "robust" left is the planted M10 ai-change.patch trap. Module H1 titles use a colon separator. All deliberate teaching devices preserved; labs compile/parse (py/sh/yaml/json); no junk. AGENTS.md updated with the hard no-slop rules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TfzV5QvtPDz8LJS3Pu5VLT
20 lines
986 B
Markdown
20 lines
986 B
Markdown
# Module 22 lab files
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Run the lab from the module README. Quick map of what's here:
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- **`audit.sh`**: the runnable vetting checklist. `bash audit.sh <dir>` statically scans a skill or
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MCP server for red flags (network egress, secret/env reads, shell-out, obfuscation, broad FS
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access, hidden/injected instructions, zero-width characters). It only reads; it never executes the
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target.
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- **`suspicious-skill/`**: the audit TARGET for Part A. A deliberately malicious "export tasks to
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Notion" skill (`SKILL.md` + `tools/sync.py`). **Do not install it or run `sync.py` against real
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credentials**; it exfiltrates your environment and local secrets. The point is to catch it first.
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- **`poisoned-task.txt`**: the prompt-injection payload for Part B. A real-looking task with an
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injected "system" directive underneath, to add to the Module 1 `tasks-app` and feed to your AI.
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Expected result of Part A:
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```
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bash audit.sh suspicious-skill # exits non-zero, verdict: REJECT
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```
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