claude
f925fd9645
Phase 2 sweep — all modules are post-pivot, so the learner directs the AI agent
(Claude Code as the worked example) to do the git/setup work and verifies, instead
of typing commands by hand; no re-teaching basics. Lesson sections are theory with
example output; all execution lives in the labs. De-slopped ("prose" etc. gone
course-wide, em-dash density thinned). /path/to placeholders -> ~/ai-workflow-course.
Every deliberate teaching device verified intact: M10 ai-change.patch trap,
M12 bad-clear-snippet, M13/M27 planted pending_count bug, M15 secret+typosquat+MD5,
M18 BREAK=1, M21 absent-.gitignore, M22 poisoned skill, M24 no-op patch, M25 --simulate.
Labs compile/parse (py/sh/yaml/json); no junk.
Closes #83
Closes #86
Closes #89
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TfzV5QvtPDz8LJS3Pu5VLT
40 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
40 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
"""Cloud-sync config for tasks-app — a realistic snapshot of what an AI hands you.
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Asked to "sync tasks to a cloud service," a model will produce something like this: it works, it
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reads naturally, it passes lint and tests... and it carries two planted flaws: a live credential
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baked straight into the source (caught by Gate 2, secret scanning) and a weak-crypto "signature"
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using MD5 (caught by Gate 3, SAST). Two different gates, two different blind spots.
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DO NOT copy these patterns. The point of this file is to be caught by a scanner, not imitated.
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The fix (read from the environment) is shown at the bottom, commented out, so you can see the
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difference once Part C of the lab is done.
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"""
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import hashlib
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# --- The problem the SECRET scanner should flag (Gate 2) ---------------------------------------
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# A hardcoded API key. Looks like a normal string literal; lint and tests will never complain.
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SYNC_API_KEY = "sk_live_9c3f2a7b41d84e0fa6b2c5d8e1f09a73bdac46"
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SYNC_ENDPOINT = "https://api.example-task-cloud.com/v1/sync"
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def sync_headers() -> dict:
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return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {SYNC_API_KEY}"}
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# --- The problem the SAST scanner should flag (Gate 3) -----------------------------------------
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# AI-classic: "sign" the request body with a quick hash. MD5 is broken for anything
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# security-relevant — a textbook weak-crypto idiom. A secret scanner won't catch this (it's not a
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# secret); a SAST tool like bandit will (it's insecure code you wrote). DO NOT imitate.
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def sign_payload(body: str) -> str:
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return hashlib.md5(body.encode()).hexdigest()
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# --- The fix (Part C) --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Read the secret from the environment instead of committing it. Proper secret management — env
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# files, secret stores, per-environment config — is Module 17. This is just enough to make the
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# scanner go quiet honestly.
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#
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# import os
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# SYNC_API_KEY = os.environ["SYNC_API_KEY"] # set it outside the repo; never commit the value
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