Adds the vendor-agnostic seam the AI assistant + match-ranking plug into:
- LLMProvider / EmbeddingProvider ABCs (base.py). LLM and embeddings are
SEPARATE abstractions — Anthropic has no embeddings endpoint, so each is
configured independently and either can be off.
- NullLLMProvider / NullEmbeddingProvider — the default; fail loud with a clear
"not configured" error so AI-off deployments don't silently no-op.
- AnthropicLLMProvider — first concrete LLM impl, via the official anthropic SDK
(default model claude-opus-4-8). A local provider (e.g. Ollama) would be
another subclass of the same interface.
- Factory in deps.py (get_llm_provider / get_embedding_provider) selects by
env (MODEL_PROVIDER / EMBEDDING_PROVIDER); documented in .env.example.
Providers are read-only text/vector producers — they never touch the DB, so the
"AI never writes autonomously" invariant (CLAUDE.md #1) holds; writes will go
through ChangeProposal (#214).
Tests: provider selection (null default, anthropic when keyed, fallback without
key) + null providers raise. 81 passed.
Closes#215
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
Adds the anonymous read surface (/api/v1/public) — the privacy-critical core.
- CurrentUserOrNone dependency: optional auth that never 401s (anonymous OK).
- public_view_service: every projection passes through privacy.person_visibility.
persons redacted (living → "Living person", hidden dropped); relationships
only when both endpoints non-hidden; events only for FULL-visibility persons
(partnership events only when both partners full); names only for FULL
persons. Not-viewable trees raise 404 (not 403) so the surface can't probe
for private trees. Media deferred (higher-sensitivity; own pass later).
- public router: read-only directory + tree + persons/relationships/events +
person detail/names/events. Directory lists `public` to all and adds
`site_members` for authenticated callers; never lists unlisted/private.
- PublicTreeRead omits owner_id.
Tests (ran locally — CI does not run pytest): an anonymous end-to-end leak test
asserting a living person's real name, alias, and birth year appear in NO public
response while the deceased person's data does; plus private=404, unlisted
viewable-by-link-but-unlisted, site_members requires login, and directory
visibility. Full suite: 70 passed. Regenerated openapi.json + TS client.
Note: the AUTHED list endpoints still leak per-person for non-members
(pre-existing) — fixed next, separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
Media model + migration; an ObjectStore interface with an S3/MinIO (boto3) implementation behind the service layer. Upload (multipart) stores bytes in object storage + a metadata row (checksum, size, content-type, optional attach to person/event/source); list returns presigned URLs; delete is soft. Editor-gated, privacy-filtered, audited. 24 tests pass (object store faked).
Introduces the worker container (same image, 'python -m app.worker'): its first job is the scheduled 30-day soft-delete purge across tables + media object cleanup. Compose gains worker + S3 env on backend/worker; dev override builds the worker too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
Pluggable AuthProvider interface with a local (email+password) implementation, and a Mailer interface (ConsoleMailer for dev, SMTPMailer for operators). The auth service owns registration, login, opaque session issuance, email verification, and password reset (which revokes prior sessions). Endpoints under /api/v1/auth; sessions are returned as a Bearer token and set as an HttpOnly cookie.
Replaces the temporary X-User-Id shim: get_current_user now resolves a real session (Bearer or cookie). The open user-bootstrap endpoint is gone (registration replaces it). App logging is configured so the ConsoleMailer's verification/reset links are visible to self-hosters. Verified end-to-end on the deploy target, including the email-verification flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
Wires the data model through repository -> service -> API/v1. The privacy engine (app/services/privacy.py) is the single enforcement point: every read resolves visibility there (tree role, tree visibility, per-person override; living-person redaction is a marked Phase 2 TODO). All writes record an attributable AuditEntry.
Endpoints: POST /users (open dev bootstrap until auth), GET /users/me, POST/GET /trees, GET /trees/{id}, and POST/GET /trees/{id}/persons. Authn is a temporary X-User-Id header shim; authz is membership-based (owner/editor/viewer). Domain errors map to 401/403/404/409. Verified on the deploy target: private tree -> 403 for non-members, missing actor -> 401, audit log populated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <justin@jpaul.me>
justin