Phase 3 — the privacy-critical anonymous read surface (/api/v1/public).
CurrentUserOrNone optional-auth dep (never 401s).
public_view_service: every projection passes through privacy.person_visibility. Persons redacted (living→"Living person", hidden dropped); relationships only when both endpoints non-hidden; events only for FULL persons (partnership events only when both partners full); names only for FULL persons. Non-viewable trees → 404 (not 403) so the surface can't probe private trees. Media deferred (own pass).
Read-only router: directory + tree + persons/relationships/events + person detail/names/events. Directory lists public to all, adds site_members for authed; never lists unlisted/private. PublicTreeRead omits owner_id.
Tests (ran locally, green — CI has no pytest): anonymous end-to-end leak test (a living person's real name/alias/birth-year appear in NO public response; deceased data does), private=404, unlisted-by-link-only, site_members-requires-login, directory visibility. Full suite 70 passed. Regenerated openapi.json + TS client.
⚠️ The AUTHED list endpoints still leak per-person for non-members (pre-existing) — fixed next, separately.
Phase 3 — the privacy-critical anonymous read surface (`/api/v1/public`).
- `CurrentUserOrNone` optional-auth dep (never 401s).
- `public_view_service`: every projection passes through `privacy.person_visibility`. Persons redacted (living→"Living person", hidden dropped); relationships only when both endpoints non-hidden; events only for FULL persons (partnership events only when both partners full); names only for FULL persons. Non-viewable trees → 404 (not 403) so the surface can't probe private trees. **Media deferred** (own pass).
- Read-only router: directory + tree + persons/relationships/events + person detail/names/events. Directory lists `public` to all, adds `site_members` for authed; never lists unlisted/private. `PublicTreeRead` omits owner_id.
**Tests (ran locally, green — CI has no pytest):** anonymous end-to-end leak test (a living person's real name/alias/birth-year appear in NO public response; deceased data does), private=404, unlisted-by-link-only, site_members-requires-login, directory visibility. Full suite **70 passed**. Regenerated openapi.json + TS client.
⚠️ The AUTHED list endpoints still leak per-person for non-members (pre-existing) — fixed next, separately.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Adds the anonymous read surface (/api/v1/public) — the privacy-critical core.
- CurrentUserOrNone dependency: optional auth that never 401s (anonymous OK).
- public_view_service: every projection passes through privacy.person_visibility.
persons redacted (living → "Living person", hidden dropped); relationships
only when both endpoints non-hidden; events only for FULL-visibility persons
(partnership events only when both partners full); names only for FULL
persons. Not-viewable trees raise 404 (not 403) so the surface can't probe
for private trees. Media deferred (higher-sensitivity; own pass later).
- public router: read-only directory + tree + persons/relationships/events +
person detail/names/events. Directory lists `public` to all and adds
`site_members` for authenticated callers; never lists unlisted/private.
- PublicTreeRead omits owner_id.
Tests (ran locally — CI does not run pytest): an anonymous end-to-end leak test
asserting a living person's real name, alias, and birth year appear in NO public
response while the deceased person's data does; plus private=404, unlisted
viewable-by-link-but-unlisted, site_members requires login, and directory
visibility. Full suite: 70 passed. Regenerated openapi.json + TS client.
Note: the AUTHED list endpoints still leak per-person for non-members
(pre-existing) — fixed next, separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Justin Paul <[email protected]>
justin
merged commit 3810b65de0 into main2026-06-09 09:17:56 -04:00
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Phase 3 — the privacy-critical anonymous read surface (
/api/v1/public).CurrentUserOrNoneoptional-auth dep (never 401s).public_view_service: every projection passes throughprivacy.person_visibility. Persons redacted (living→"Living person", hidden dropped); relationships only when both endpoints non-hidden; events only for FULL persons (partnership events only when both partners full); names only for FULL persons. Non-viewable trees → 404 (not 403) so the surface can't probe private trees. Media deferred (own pass).publicto all, addssite_membersfor authed; never lists unlisted/private.PublicTreeReadomits owner_id.Tests (ran locally, green — CI has no pytest): anonymous end-to-end leak test (a living person's real name/alias/birth-year appear in NO public response; deceased data does), private=404, unlisted-by-link-only, site_members-requires-login, directory visibility. Full suite 70 passed. Regenerated openapi.json + TS client.
⚠️ The AUTHED list endpoints still leak per-person for non-members (pre-existing) — fixed next, separately.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code