justinandClaude Opus 5
0263f3797a
hooks/README.md said the win2019-1 denial happened because Zerto cannot insert a tagged checkpoint on an AWS-protected VPG. That is not what happened, and it is not true on 10.9.10. The insert succeeded. The checkpoint is in the journal as cp 56, stamped about a minute after the hook had already reported failure. What actually happened is that wait_for_tag gave up after its hardcoded 45s, which is generous on a VPG that checkpoints every 5s and far too short on one that checkpoints every 630s. So the documented "verified" example was a false denial. The deny path works; that particular denial was wrong. Recorded as a known issue, because a guard that silently refuses legitimate work on every cloud-protected VM while looking correct is a worse failure than the one it exists to prevent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016yVfC5nvZowoLFnEGWhLGn
94 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
94 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
# PreToolUse guard hook
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Makes the rewind guard enforceable instead of advisory.
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The MCP server cannot see another server's tool calls, so `zerto_check_tool` and
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`zerto_guard_before_mutate` only work if the model chooses to call them. A model
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that skips the step is not stopped by anything. A `PreToolUse` hook runs in the
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host, where the tool call genuinely pauses, so a failed checkpoint stops the
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change.
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## Decisions
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| situation | decision | effect |
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|---|---|---|
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| tool in `read_only_tools` | none | runs, no checkpoint |
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| mutating, checkpoint confirmed | none, plus `additionalContext` | runs, and the model is told which checkpoint to recover from |
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| mutating, checkpoint failed | `deny` | **the call never happens** |
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| mutating, VM unknown to Zerto | `prompt` | human decides; nothing to rewind to |
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| mutating, no VM in the arguments | `prompt` | catalog's `vm_arg` did not match |
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| unlisted tool | `prompt` | nobody said it was read-only |
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`ZERTO_HOOK_UNKNOWN` switches the unlisted case to `allow` or `deny`.
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## Install
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```bash
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cp hooks/settings.example.json /tmp/x # then merge the hooks block into
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# .claude/settings.json
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export ZERTO_REWIND_CONFIG=/abs/path/config.json
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```
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Both paths in the command must be absolute, and the interpreter must be the
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venv that has this package installed.
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## Timeouts, which matter here
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The hook is synchronous: the host waits. That is the point, because the
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checkpoint has to exist before the change does.
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Budget for the slow path, not the fast one. A successful tag took about 4s
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against a healthy vSphere-protected VPG, but a **refusal took 63s**, because
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`wait_for_tag` spends 45s before giving up.
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So:
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- `timeout` in settings.json: 180 (seconds)
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- `ZERTO_HOOK_GUARD_TIMEOUT`: 150 (seconds), kept under it
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If the host's timeout fires first it cancels the hook and **discards its
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output**, and the tool call carries on through the normal permission flow. A
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timeout is therefore a silent failure of the guard, which is why the hook's own
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budget is the smaller of the two: it would rather deny than be cancelled.
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## Verified behaviour
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Against a live ZVM 10.9.10, all six rows of the table above. Two worth naming:
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- `jp-ubuntu` (healthy, local VPG) tagged checkpoint 7180 and allowed the call,
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passing the tag back through `additionalContext`.
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- `win2019-1` (VPG `CMH-AWS-1`, protected site AWS) was **denied**. The deny path
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works, but see the known issue below: that particular denial was wrong.
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Both decisions held with `permission_mode: bypassPermissions`. A hook still
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blocks when the user has turned permissions off, which is when an agent is most
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likely to be running unattended.
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## Log
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`~/.zerto-guard-hook.log`, or `ZERTO_HOOK_LOG`. One line per decision.
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## Known issue: false denials on cloud-protected VPGs
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The `win2019-1` denial above was a **false negative**, and it is worth
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understanding before relying on this hook in an estate with cloud-protected
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workloads.
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`wait_for_tag` gives up after a hardcoded 45s. That is generous for a
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vSphere-protected VPG, which checkpoints every 5s and surfaces a tag in about
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4s. It is far too short elsewhere: a tag takes ~34s to appear on an
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Azure-protected VPG and ~128s on an AWS-protected one, because journal cadence
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is set by the protected site (5s vSphere, 60s Azure, 630s AWS).
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So the hook denied the change, and the checkpoint landed anyway. It is in the
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journal as `cp 56`, timestamped a minute after the hook reported failure. The
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guard told the agent there was no rewind point while Zerto was in the middle of
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creating one.
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That failure mode is worse than the one the hook guards against, because it is
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silent and looks correct: legitimate work is refused on every cloud-protected VM
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while the log reads like the guard is doing its job.
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Until `wait_for_tag` becomes cadence-aware, scope this hook's matcher to
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vSphere-protected workloads.
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